Este mensaje me ha llegado desde Libia por medio de una amiga argelina.  Da una idea de los motivos que mueven a muchos de los jóvenes libios y su revolución.

بيان انتصار ثورة 17 فبراير المباركة
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بسم الدماء الطاهرة الزكية لشهداء الثورة الليبية التي فجرها شبابنا البواسل سلمياً في جميع مدن وقرى وواحات ليبيا العزيزة وانضمت إليها مختلف فئات وشرائح المجتمع وأسقطت الدكتاتورية بكل أدواتها ولجانها.
وبالنظر لما قام به هذا النظام من إطلاق النار بكافة أنواع الأسلحة واستخدام العنف المفرط ضد المتظاهرين العزل المسالمين من أبناء الشعب الليبي واستخدام فرق الموت من المرتزقة الأجانب لقمع هذا الشعب، ونظراً للجرائم الوحشية والانتهاكات الصارخة لحقوق الإنسان وحرياته ولكافة الأعراف والمواثيق الوطنية والدولية، عليه نعلن:
1- بناء دولة ليبيا الموحدة الحرة المدنية كاملة السيادة.
2- وضع دستور يستمد شرعيته من إرادة الشعب وثورة 17 فبراير المظفرة ومستنداً على احترام حقوق الإنسان وضمان الحريات العامة والفصل بين السلطات واستقلال القضاء وبناء المؤسسات الوطنية على أسس تكفل المشاركة الواسعة والتعددية والتداول السلمي الديمقراطي للسلطة وحق التمثيل لكل فئات وشرائح الشعب الليبي.
3- التأكيد على وحدة الشعب الليبي والتراب الوطني وتماسك نسيجه الاجتماعي.
4- احترام كافة الاتفاقيات والمواثيق الدولية أسوة بأعضاء المجتمع الدولي.
5- حماية وصيانة أرواح وممتلكات كل المتواجدين على أرض ليبيا من مواطنين وأجانب.
 
 إن هذا الإعلان يعبر عن روح ثورة 17 فبراير الساعية لإعادة بناء الدولة الليبية على أسس الشرعية والقانون والمؤسسات المستلهمة من نضال الشعب الليبي البطل عبر تاريخه وما يقره بإرادته الحرة.
وفي الوقت ذاته نهيب بكافة الدول والهيئات والمنظمات الدولية والإقليمية ومنظمات حقوق الإنسان لأداء واجبها الإنساني لإيقاف المجزرة وجرائم الإبادة الجماعية التي ترتكبها فلول النظام المنهار ضد أبناء وبنات وأطفال شعبنا الباسل الأعزل في عاصمتنا طرابلس وباقي مدننا وقرانا.
  وإذ نعلن هذا البيان إعلاناً لانتصار ثورة 17 فبراير الشبابية وقطعاً للطريق على الانتهازيين والانقلابيين فإننا نتطلع إلى قرب تحرر عاصمتنا من ربقة الطغيان.
عاشت ثورة 17 فبراير الشبابية السلمية المباركة
عاشت ليبيا جمهورية حرة موحدة
ثوار 17 فبراير

ليبيا الحرة في: 22 فبراير 2011

RESUMENES EN FRANCES Y DESPÚES EN CASTELLANO

1 - construction d'un Etat libyen uni, libre, souverain
2 - Mise en place d'une constitution garantissant les libertés publiques et respectueuse des droits de l'homme, de la séparation des pouvoirs et de l'indépendance de la justice et l'instauration d'institutions nationales représentatives, participatives et pluralistes, reconnaissant l'alternance démocratique et pacifique du pouvoir et le droit à la représentation de toutes les composantes du peuple libyen.
3 - réaffirmation de l'unité du peuple libyen et de la cohésion de son tissu social
4 - respect de toutes les conventions internationales et chartes de la communauté internationale
5 Protection de tous les biens du peuple libyen et de toutes les personnes étrangères présentes sur le sol.
 
"Cette déclaration est le reflet de l'esprit qui anime la révolution du 17 février afin de procéder à la reconstruciton de l'Etat libyen sur la base du droit et de la légitimité (...). Nous en appelons à tous les Etats, insitutions internationales et régionales ainsi à qu'à toutes les institutions défendant les droits de l'homme de mettre fin à ce crime contre l'humanité que commet le pouvoir en place (...). Ce communiqué est celui de la victoire de la révolution du 17 février et  nous sommes en marche pour libérer notre capitale Tripoli"
 
"vive la révolution jeune et pacifique"
 
"Vive la libye unie et libre"

Declaración de Benghazi, 22 de febrero de 2011

 1. La construcción de un estado líbio unido, libre y soberano.

2. La aprobación de una constitución que garantiza las libertades públicas y que repeta los derechos humanos, la separación de poderes y la independencia de la justicia y la instauración de instituciones nacionales representativas, participativas y pluralistas, reconciendo la alternancia democrática y pacífica del poder y el derecho a la representación de todos los componentes del pueblo líbio.

3. La reafirmación de la unidad del pueblo libio y de la cohesión del su tejido social.

4. El respeto de todas las convenciones internacionales y cartas de la comunidad internacional.

5. La protección de todos los bienes del pueblo líbio y de todas las personas extranjeras presentes en suelo líbio.

"Esta declaración refleja el espiritú que anima la revolución del 17 de febrero con el objetivo de proceder a la reconstrucción del Estado Líbio sobre la base del derecho y de la legitimidad (....) Hacemos un llamamiento a todos los estados, instituciones internacionales y regionales, así como  a todas las instituciones que defienden los derechos humanos que pongan fin a este crimen contra la humanidad que esta cometiendo el actual régimen (....) Este comunicado es el de la victoria del 17 de febrero y ya estamos en marcha para liberar nuestra capital Tripoli. "

"¡Viva la revolución joven y pacífica!"

"¡Viva la líbia unida y libre!"

One of the often heard responses in Israel to the Egyptian popular
rebellion has been the consideration of the Muburak regime as a
necessary “lesser evil” to any form of democratic rule that would lead
inevitably to an unstable and dangerous radical Islamic alternative.
Obamaś support for “a democratic transition” and “free elections” in
Egypt is considered by many Israeli leaders and some right wing leaders
in the US as “throwing Egypt to the dogs.” Even some see “the fall
of Egypt” as creating a dire situation for Israel because “Israel can
only make peace with dictators” due to the endemic hate for Israel and
Jews among the Arab population.

These double-standard arguments that base “stability” on oppression are
at once incoherent, simplistic and, ultimately, dangerous
self-fulfilling prophecies  for the future and viability of Israel. Can
Israel"s security and certain supposed “western interests” justify
supporting the endless subjugation and hopelessness of tens of millions
of Egyptians and other Arab citizens? Can a combination of fear and
racist condescension justify saying “democracy is not for Arabs”? Can
Israel ever accept that it is a part of the Middle East and that it
cannot ignore the language, culture and public opinion of  neigbouring
arab countries?

It is true that the arduous and long task of creating democratic
institutions and a tolerant culture of political pluralism goes far
beyond the fall of a dictatorship and the organization of free
elections. This is especially true in a big country like Egypt where
tremendous poverty and illiteracy are very fertile ground for religious
extremism. But the greatest danger of extremism is precisely the lack of
hope for a better and freer society among millions of young people.

Nevertheless, many fallacies are being repeated. The Muslim Brotherhood,
while not a liberal party, is clearly not a copy of the Iranian
Ayatollahs or other fundamentalists. Many of them even say they want to
follow the example the moderate Turkish islamic leaders while others
insist that they will respect a pluralistic civil state and do not wish
to impose the Sharia or other radical measures. One must also keep in
mind the moderating influence of many smaller secular opposition groups
and the influence of the westerned trained Egyptian army that will
surely not favour the formation of a radical government that breaks with
the West. In fact, in the daily protests when some islamists shouted the
slogan “Islam is the answer”, the majority of the crowd drowned them out
with chants of “Moslems and Christians together for Egypt”. While most
Egyptians are deeply religious the present wave of protests across the
arab world has very little to do with an “Islamic revolution.”

Israel"s strategic position over the last 30 years has been based on a
close security relationship with Egypt. Needless to say, the changes
taking place in Egypt, will have a profound effect on the future
security and political possibilities of Israel. Since any future
Egyptian Government will be much more sensitive to the the pressure of
public opinion, there will obviously be more problems for close
Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation with regards to Gaza, the
Palestinians in general and the Sinai peninsula.

Even a slow transition toward democracy will create much greater
pressure in favour of a political solution to the Palestinian problem
and make the present Israeli entrenchment untenable.

While peace between Egypt and Israel will surely not be in danger,
there will be more turbulences in the up until now smooth workings of the
1979 Israel-Egypt peace agreement. From now on Israel will not be able
to almost ignore its southern security flank. Also placed in jeopardy is
the blockade of Gaza that requires Egyptian cooperation. Any
democratically elected Egyptian Government will have a hard time
accepting the present policy of intimate military cooperation
based on the status quo of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis.

A new regional order possibly is in the making in which Israel cannot
continue acting as if what is happening on the other side of the walls
and fences does not concern them. Israel and the Zionist movement has
always had a clear preference for the top-down approach of palace
politics or super-power protection.

As political thinker Hannah Arendt wrote in 1944: “Nationalism is bad
enough when it trusts in nothing but the rude force of the nation. A
nationalism that necessarily and admittedly depends upon the force of a
foreign power is certainly worse . . . the Zionists, if they continue to
ignore the Mediterranean peoples and watch out only for the big faraway
powers, will appear only as their tools, the agents of foreign and
hostile interests.”


Now, in the context of historic changes in the Arab world it is
essential for Israel to heed the writing on the wall, to open up to a
broader concept of politics, to quickly accept the challenge of a just
peace with the Palestinians by withdrawing from the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, to end the blockade of Gaza and to allow Palestinians to
breathe, to accept international security arrangements on the ground, to
look at the big picture of the Mid-East and to start ignoring the
smaller pictures of extremist settler groups and other narrow minded
nationalists.


The events in Egypt are a serious wake up call for Israel. The Tel Aviv
“bubble” has burst.

David Hammerstein

Ideas posed by the UN Conference on Palestine Geneva 22-24 of July

  There is a growing consensus that "business as usual" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is coming to an end and that Israel´s "free lunch"  might soon have a price on it. 

 There are a number of new elements. Strengthened by a stronger US position, the Palestinian Authority seems determined not to renew negotiations unless there is a real freeze on settlement building.  The EU´s High Representative Javier Solana has suggested that the UN Security Council set a mandatory deadline for the establishment of a Palestinian State, whether there is a negotiated settlement or not, placing on the table the ultimate threat to impose a solution to the conflict with International forcese. The Quartet is pressuring heavily on Israel to ease the blockade and accept the entrance of construction material (11.5 million euros) for the completion of public works projects in Gaza that have been pending for years and there is growing pressure to start reconstruction work in Gaza as well.

   The  loud and frequent calls for war crimes trials against Isrrael will probably not go anywhere but for the first time the UN is pressing Israel seriously to pay reparations for the UN property and material destroyed during the Cast Lead operation. The EU is not vocal on this issue.  At the same time there seems to be growing criciticism among European Commission Officials that the present massive expenditure paid by taxpayers for maintaining Palestinian life under the occupation cannot continue indefinitely and without any costs for Israel.  The present status quo is not  successful "state building", with no final agreement in sight,  and it is not creating political progress on the ground. Instead, dependency on EU aide is creating a vast "occupation business" with vested lucrative interests while Israel pays little or nothing for the endless occupation. It was suggested in my presentation that the EU and the International Community should condition this form of indirect  aide to Israel (who should legally pay as the occupier) to concrete improvement in the situation on the ground, lifting the seige in Gaza and  the opening up a political perspective for peace. Obviously this threat of withdrawal o change in EU aide does not mean harming the well-being of the Palestinian civilian population nor cutting humanitarian aide but it does mean making Israel understand that the present situation is unsustainable both economically and politically.

   At the conference, there was an interesting presentation by Israeli and Palestinian journalists that showed the monolithic self-censorship of the Israeli press that covered up everything that went on in Gaza during the war and became uncritical spokesmen of the IDF.  They also spoke of the dehumanization and the invisibility of the Palestinians  in Israeli press and society. 

   The Palestinian Ambassador closed the conference  outlining  the concrete initiatives to start the reconstruction of Gaza, with or without an agreement with Hamas,  the procedures for seeking reparation for the Gaza operation and many diplomatic fronts to accelerate the process ot the creation of a Palestinian state. He was very clear that the ANP would not go back to an endless peace process while settlement building continues and the seige of Gaza was in place. 

 THE ISRAELI - PALESTINIAN 
CONFLICT IN THE WAKE OF THE GAZA OPERATION 

How to break the status quo through international accountability, public pressure and the application of International Law.

THE GAZA CAST LEAD OPERATION:

 It should be noted that the operation against the civilian population continues.  The present humanitarian siege is an illegal form a warfare that denies fundamental rights to civilians.  I will not go into great detail because the impact of the Cast Lead operation and the violation of International Humanitarian Law is well documented in the Amnesty International report recently published and I coincide with its recommendations and demands toward Israel, Hamas and the International Community that include an arms embargo, reparations, a criminal investigation and international protection of civilians. 

WHAT WE SAW ON THE 10TH OF JANUARY IN GAZA:

We saw a helpless population totally dependent on international organisations, mainly UNRWA, for all basic necessities.  We saw the destruction of all public buildings that often affected the homes adjacent to them. There was no electricity nor potable running water. There was no rubbish collection No cars were in the street. There were no signs of armed people. We only saw military aircraft and other  aerial Israeli equipment. The bombing continued a few hundred metres from where we were. We picked up off the ground the leaflets launched by the Israelis warning the population of heavy bombing and to seek safe refuge.  Mothers with babies in their arms pulled on our arms asking for help to stop the bombing. We were the only European representatives to visit Gaza during the Cast Lead operation.  It is important to point out that the prohibition of the presence of international press and witnesses was one of the keys of impunity during this conflict that resulted in so many deaths of innocent civilians. 

POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament has repeatedly supported the following positions over the last 5 years in different resolutions adopted by a wide majority:

-Lifting of the siege of Gaza and the end of collective punishment of the civilian population.

- The end to the use of disproportionate force, illegal weapons or indiscriminate victimisation of the civilian population on the part of Israel.

- The end to the firing of rockets by Palestinians from Gaza on the civilian population of Southern Israel.

- In favour of a unity agreement of Hamas and Fatah as a necessary step for international peacemaking measures in Gaza and the West Bank.

- A total suspension of the settlement building.

- The free movement of people and goods both in Gaza and the West Bank.

-  The conditioning of future EU policy to concrete progress on the ground.

- The investigation of possible war crimes committed by Israel and by Hamas in the Gaza conflict.

- The deployment of international forces in and around Gaza.

- The building of a large solar plant for electricity and desalinisation in or near Gaza for energy and water autonomy.

- Against the upgrading of relations with Israel under the present circumstances.

Note:  The Parliament has no foreign policy co-decision but can influence policy through its opinions and through the control of budgetary control.

 

What needs to be done:

UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NEEDS GREATER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND INVOLVEMENT

BREAK THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK: SET A DEADLINE BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE "TWO STATE SOLUTION" WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF PALESTINE IN THE UN

The European Union's top foreign policy representative Javier Solana has recently called for the United Nations Security Council to recognise a Palestinian State and the two-state solution by a certain deadline even if Israel and others do not.  This initiative should be considered for support by the international community.

We find ourselves in a dangerous stalemate and only the short-term interests of the Israeli Government and the most radical elements on both sides, not the long-term well-being of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, are benefited by the perpetuation of status quo. The Palestinian Authority leadership currently refuses to enter negotiations with Israel until it stops construction of illegal West Bank settlements, recognises past agreements, and agrees to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State. At the same time the uncompromising positions of Netanyahu on settlements, Jerusalem and Gaza are far from being a basis for any fruitful negotiations with any Palestinian counterparts. The Arab League Plan for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is being ignored while the lack of Palestinian unity between Fatah and Hamas is a serious barrier to a serious political peace process.  After more that forty years of occupation the international community should take the initiative. 

After a fixed deadline, a UN Security Council resolution should proclaim the adoption of the two-state solution and the declaration should include the borders of the Palestinian State, the fate of Palestinian refugees, control over Jerusalem and security arrangements and international guarantees. 

It would accept the Palestinian State as a full member of the UN, and set a calendar for implementation. It would mandate the resolution of other remaining territorial disputes and legitimise the end of claims," 

The UN Security Council should mandate a return to Israel's borders before the 1967 war in which it occupied the West Bank and Gaza, except for agreed upon land swaps and mediators should set a timetable for a final peace agreement. If the parties are not able to stick to it (the timetable), then a solution backed by the international community should be put on the table. It is a time of action not a time for words but for deeds.  This conference should support Solana´s proposal that is basically in line with the proposals of the Arab Peace Initiative and other similiar proposals. 

EU Political Policy on the Mid-East does not really exist; it usually echoes US policy or plays the role of a "Sherpa" for Obama´s new policies

   It should be noted that Foreign Policy is competence of the Council of Ministers that must act with unanimity and the reality is that a number of countries have very different views on the Middle East. Italy and some Eastern European countries hold very uncritical positions toward present Israeli policy. 

IS THE EU  FINANCING THE "OCCUPATION BUSINESS" THROUGH ITS FINANCIAL AIDE? IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? If tHe EU pays it should also play. 

The EU greatest allotment of aide per capita is for the Palestinian authority. If this is added to money donated by member states the amount is staggering.  Teachers, nurses, civil servants, police and others all receive their monthly salaries from the EU. As well, tens of thousands of Palestinians depend on EU humanitarian aide.  Nevertheless, we should evaluate if this policy is a positive one that contributes to the building of institutions for peace or if it simply is a massive subsidy of the Israeli occupation that eliminates Israel´s legal responsibility of providing services to the occupied population. In other words, are we helping to make the occupation economically bearable and not costly for Israel, basically letting the occupier off the hook.  Another question is if decades of massive "occupation business" made possible mainly by the EU is actually creating vested interests and dependency on both sides, both economical and political, for the indefinite continuation of the occupation. Where is the incentive for reaching a two-state solution? What would happen if the EU decided to cut off all but humanitarian aide unless Israel took a number of measures to  make life more bearable for Palestinians with regard to the siege of Gaza, movement and settlements.  Israel would dread the threat of withdrawal of aide and the possible collapse of institutions. It is evident that the present status quo cannot continue. Since the EU pays it must play as well. 

A MORE POLITICAL EU POLICY ON MID-EAST PEACE?
 

    The EU should condition the continuation of its substantial economic aide to substantial improvement of conditions on the ground for Palestinian life in the occupied territories and concrete benchmarks with consequences for Israel concerning settlements, freedom of movement and changes in the status quo in Jerusalem.   The issues of rights for the Palestinian minority in Israel, the rule of law under the PA and Hamas,  freedom and equality of religion and non-discrimination in land laws, demolitions and building should shape economic relations and the participation in EU programmes.

  The EU is not a humanitarian NGO. It cannot continue to be a big payer but a very small player.  The lack of clear and effective EU policy reflects the absence of ambition and the great weakness of the present procedures of decision making in EU institutions.  To a great extent the outcome of the present conflict of the Obama Administration with the Israeli Government over settlement building and especially Jerusalem will express the possibilities of success of both US  and EU policy. 

  Only strong political and public pressure can bring EU leaders and member states to act more forcefully and in accordance with International law.

The alternative is to face the relentless pedagogy of catastrophe.  

  It is not a question of being pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli.  It is in the interest of all to take steps toward the negotiated end of the conflict and to place strong international guarantees against violence and suffering of both Palestinians and Israelis. 

 EXTRAÑOS EN BUSCA DE LA UNIDAD DE UNA ISLA

    Del miércoles al viernes de esta semana he participado en una delegación parlamentaria singular: "El grupo de alto nivel para relaciones con el norte de Chipre", con el objetivo de tomar un pulso a las negociaciones en curso entre la República de Chipre (de cultura griega y ortodoxos) y la no-reconocida República Turca del norte de Chipre.

Hemos hablado con todos los máximos actores en las conversaciones y negociación de los dos lados, además con los mediadores de la ONU, con la ONGs, y con los embajadores europeos. Mi conclusión no es nada optimista en lo referido a la posibilidad de poder llegar a un acuerdo este año debido a las enormes dificultades culturales, geopolíticas y históricas que hay en juego, y también por la falta de presión europea a favor de compromisos por las dos partes.  Las conversaciones no van bien, y sin un fuerte empuje de afuera, es posible que se pierda para siempre la posibilidad de un Chipre unido que fuera capaz de dar un paso en la superación de las heridas del pasado, y que pudiera dar un ejemplo muy necesitado de sensatez política a pocos kilómetros del Oriente Próximo.  

Los grandes escollos de las negociaciones son:

       La propiedad: Los grecochipriotas exigen que los ex propietarios de terrenos, casas, o edificios, tengan el derecho prioritario a la restitución de las posesiones que perdieron en la guerra de 1974 y que actualmente están en manos de colonos y turcochipriotas (que también perdieron sus casas en el sur). En cambio los turcochipriotas solo conceden alguna forma de compensación económica por la pérdida de propiedades, pero no quieren considerar la devolución de las propiedades apropiadas en el norte. 

      El futuro gobierno: Mientras los grecochipriotas quieren un estado federal con una ejecutiva fuerte, los turcochipriotas quieren una forma de arreglo confederal en el cual apenas haya competencias por encima de la autonomia de cada comunidad.  Tienen mucho miedo de quedar a expensas de la mayoría griega. En suma quieren abrir las fronteras y entrar en la Unión Europea como parte de un Chipre unificado "light" que solo se pudiera preocupar de problemas como la gripe aviar, el tráfico aéreo y el reparto de los fondos europeos.

   Distancia y desconexión sociocultural: también hay problemas de fondo de índole sociocultural. Desde el 1974 los habitantes del norte y del sur se han convertido en extraños.

     Extraños sin una lengua común: Los dos líderes chipriotas Chistofias y Talat negocian el futuro de la isla en inglés. Después de 35 años de separación, la gran mayoría de los habitantes del norte ya no saben griego y los del sur nunca han sabido expresarse en la lengua de la minoría turca. La comunicación de las ONGs conjuntas, los campamentos por la paz, y los demás contactos personales suelen hacerse en inglés. Sin saber la lengua del otro es muy difícil entrar en la psicología profunda y el compromiso conjunto que no excluya al otro vecino para crear una identidad común, y esta lejanía linguística aumenta más la desconfianza y el encierro particular. 

    Extraños en su propio ghetto: Los turcochipriotas originarios de la isla constituyen unos ochenta mil, mientras que los colonos turcos, sobretodo de la pobre región de Anatolia, son más de 150 mil.  Los colonos tienen un nivel cultural y un nivel de vida más bajo, y son mucho más tradicionales en sus costumbres que los turcochipriotas, lo que crea tensiones y desconfianza mutua. La nueva demografía del norte aleja aún más la posibilidad de una futura integración social y crea unas grandes trabas a las negociaciones. ¿Quien es chipriota? ¿Tienen que irse los colonos? o ¿cuantos pueden quedarse dentro del marco de un acuerdo político entre las dos partes?

    Extraños en Europa: El norte vive bastante aislado del mundo, y en cambio, el sur está totalmente integrado en las rutas de la globalización económica y turística. El más de un millón de prósperos habitantes grecochipriotas de la Republica de Chipre viajan a menudo a Europa, reciben a millones de turistas al año, y tienen un nivel de vida tan alto como España. En contraste, el norte apenas recibe turistas, no tiene vuelos de los países europeos, vive en el ostracismo diplomático más absoluto, y no puede tener un comercio directo con ningún país europeo por presión de Grecia y Chipre. El sur disfruta de todas ventajas del mercado europeo mientras el norte vive en la dependencia de Turquía para casi todo. 
 

       El cuarto de millón de turcochipriotas y turcos a secas (más de 150 mil colonos) del norte viven aislados sin comunicación aéreo ni comercio directo excepto con Turquía.  Viven como si estuvieran en una provincia de Turquía fuertemente custodiados y condicionados por miles de tropas turcas. Es importante tener en cuenta que el ejercito turco actúa como garante del estado laico, es muy nacionalista, y a menudo mantiene posiciones divergentes con el gobierno islámico moderado de Ankara. Es probable que el ejercito tome posiciones más beligerante hacía concesiones en la cuestión chipriota que el propio gobierno turco y los mismos turcochipriotas. 

      Está en juego mucho. La UE tiene que mostrar que puede ser decisiva en resolver el conflicto de forma no cruenta (por ahora) en la isla y sin contaminar sus relaciones con Turquía, y ni mucho menos con Grecia. Si se fracasa en el intento negociador se habrán agriado una parte importante de las posibilidades de una alianza estratégica y política con Turquía a favor de la paz y la estabilidad en el Oriente Próximo. En gran medida, el debate sobre Chipre es un debate sobre lo que deben ser las fronteras exteriores de Europa con el mundo islámico.